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INCONSISTENCIES IN THE FEDERAL
CIRCUIT COURTS' APPLICATION OF THE
COCONSPIRATOR EXCEPTION
The Federal Rules of Evidence' define hearsay as a statement,' other
than a statement the declarant 3 made while testifying at a trial or hear-
ing, offered into evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
4
Hearsay statements are inadmissible' unless sanctioned by the Federal
Rules of Evidence.6 Federal Rule 801(d)(2)(E), 7 a codification of the com-
1 Pub. L. No. 93-595 § 1, Jan. 2, 1975, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§
101-1103 (1976)).
1 Rule 801(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence defines "statement" as "(1) an oral or
written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by him as an asser-
tion." FED. R. EvID. 801(a). The Advisory Committee intended this definition to "exclude
from the operation of the hearsay rule all evidence of conduct, verbal or nonverbal, not in-
tended as an assertion." Advisory Committee's Note, FED. R. EviD. 801(a) (1976).
Rule 801(b) defines "declarant" as "a person who makes a statement." FED. R. EVID.
801(b).
FED. R. EviD. 801(c). The definition of hearsay stated in the Federal Rules is similar
to Dean McCormick's characterization. See Advisory Committee's Note, FED. R. EVID.
801(c) (1976). McCormick defined hearsay as comprising in court testimony and written
evidence of out-of-court statements that the witness offered to show the truth of matters
asserted. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 246 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter
cited as McCoRMICK].
5 FED. R. EvID. 802. See Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 273 (1912). Hearsay
statements are inadmissible because the declarant is unavailable for cross examination, the
declarant did not make the statements under sanction of an oath, and the factfinder does not
have the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the declarant. Id.; MCCORMICK, supra note
4, at § 245.
6 FED. R. EVID. 802. Rule 803 lists exceptions to the hearsay rule which apply
regardless of the declarant's availability to testify. FED. R. EvID. 803. Rule 804 enumerates
additional exceptions that apply if the declarant is unavailable to testify. FED. R. EvID. 804.
Rule 801(d) establishes two additional groups of statements that qualify as nonhearsay
evidence. FED. R. EviD. 801(d).
I Rule 801(d) provides "[A] statement is not hearsay if... (2) [t]he statement is offered
against a party and is ... (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course of
and in furtherance of the conspiracy." The practice of admitting coconspirator statements
developed not on a doctrine of the law of evidence but upon the substantive law of crime.
Van Riper v. United States, 13 F.2d 961, 967 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 702 (1926).
Theoretically, coconspirators are partners in crime and thus become each other's ad hoc
agent. Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 218 n.6 (1974); Van Riper v. United States,
13 F.2d 961, 967 (2d Cir. 1926). Thus, each coconspirator is liable for the other
coconspirator's declarations. Van Riper v. United States, 13 F.2d 961, 967 (2d Cir. 1926). The
Advisory Committee to the Federal Rules of Evidence, however, labelled the agency theory
of conspiracy a fiction. Advisory Committee's Note, FED. R. EviD. 801(d)(2)(E) (1976). Never-
theless, the agency theory continues to serve as a popular rationale for the coconspirator
exception. See Marcus, Co-Conspirator Declarations: The Federal Rules of Evidence and
Other Recent Developments, From a Criminal Law Perspective, 7 AM. J. CRIM. LAW 287,
289 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Co-Conspirator Declarations]; Note, Inculpatory Declara-
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mon law coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule, furnishes pro-
secutors with a means to enter otherwise inadmissible hearsay into
evidence! Rule 801 (d)(2)(E) permits the admission of a coconspirator's
out-of-court assertions as nonhearsay evidence9 if the prosecution
satisfactorily establishes all three of the rule's requirenients." The pro-
secution must prove that the conspiracy existed," that the defendant
had a connection with the conspiracy,12 and that the coconspirator made
tions Against Penal Interest and the Coconspirator Rule Under the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 56 IND. L.J. 151, 155 n.23 (1980). For a discussion of the various theories used to
explain the coconspirator exception, see M. SEIDMAN, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN INDIANA 118
n.14 (1977). For a discussion of the common law origins and development of the
coconspirator exception, see 37 Lou. L. REV. 1101, 1101-1109 (1977).
4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, § 801(d)(2)(E)[1], 801-166 (1979).
S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 460 (2d ed. 1977)
[hereinafter cited as FEDERAL RULES MANUAL]. The distinction between terming an admissi-
ble coconspirator statement under rule 801(d)(2)(E) nonhearsay instead of an exception to
the hearsay rule is purely semantic. United States v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1227, 1231 n.6 (8th Cir.
1978).
10 FED. R. EVID. 801; United States v. James, 576 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1978), rehearing
en banc, 590 F.2d 575, 578 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979); United States v.
Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20, 22 (1st Cir. 1977); United States v. Snow, 521 F.2d 730, 733 (9th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied 423 U.S. 1090 (1976). The coconspirator exception does not require a
declarant to be unavailable to testify. United States v. Snow, 521 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir.
1975). The prosecutor also has no duty to subpoena and produce all available witnesses
before he can use the coconspirator exception. Id. at 736. But cf. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S.
56, 65 (1980), cert. denied, No. 80-5068 (confrontation clause of sixth amendment demands
that prosecutor either produce declarant or demonstrate declarant's unavailability). See
generally, Note, Co-Conspirator Declarations: Procedure and Standard of Proof for Admis-
sion Under the FederalRules of Evidence, 55 CHi-KENT L. REV. 577 (1979) [hereinafter cited
as Procedure and Standard of ProoA.
" See United States v. Gil, 604 F.2d 546, 549 (7th Cir. 1979). Although any provable
criminal conspiracy most likely will satisfy the coconspirator exception, conspiracy as a con-
cept of substantive criminal law is distinct from the evidentiary concept of conspiracy. Id.
The crime of conspiracy requires a meeting of the coconspirators' minds, intent, and, where
statutorally required, an overt act. Id. The party wishing to use the coconspirator exception
does not have to allege or prove the substantive crime of conspiracy. Id. The exception
operates independently of any conspiracy charge. See, e.g., United States v. Stanchich, 550
F.2d 1294, 1299 (2d Cir. 1977) (although evidence was insufficient to submit conspiracy count
to jury, court admitted hearsay on substantive charges under coconspirator exception);
United States v. Trowery, 542 F.2d 623, 626 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1104 (1977)
(prosecution does not need to allege conspiracy to use coconspirator exception). Parties in
both civil and criminal cases can use the coconspirator exception. See United States v.
Cahalane, 560 F.2d 601, 605 n.4 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1045 (1978)
(coconspirator exception applicable in criminal cases); South-East Coal Co. v. Consolidation
Coal Co., 434 F.2d 767, 788 (6th Cir. 1970) (coconspirator exception applicable in civil
actions).
12 United States v. Glasser, 315 U.S. 60, 74-75 (1942). Circumstantial evidence can pro-
vide the necessary amount of independent proof of the defendant's connection with the con-
spiracy. See United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 770 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Jones, 542 F.2d 186, 203 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 922 (1976); United States v.
Calaway, 524 F.2d 609, 612 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 967 (1976).
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the statements during the course of13 and in furtherance of14 the con-
,3 FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(E). The "during the course" requirement mandates that the
coconspirator must have made the statement while the declarant and defendant currently
were engaged in a plan to commit crime. 4 J. WEINSTEIN, EVIDENCE § 801[01] at 801-151
(1975) [hereinafter cited as WEINSTEIN]. The issue that arises most frequently under this re-
quirement is whether the arrest of the coconspirators terminates the conspiracy. See
Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 442-43 (1949) (coconspirator statement made
after central aim of alleged conspiracy ended, and declarant and defendant arrested were in-
admissible); United States v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1227, 1237 (8th Cir. 1978) (conspiracy could con-
tinue even after one coconspirator's arrest where evidence demonstrates that remaining co-
conspirators still are capable of carrying out conspiracy); United States v. Di Rodio, 565 F.2d
573, 575-76 (9th Cir. 1977) (statements made subsequently to arrest of declarant/codefendant
were inadmissible); United States v. Caro, 569 F.2d 411, 416 n.9 (5th Cir. 1978) (declarant's
assertive action inadmissible since made following declarant's arrest and serving no con-
ceivable purpose of the conspiracy). Coconspirator statements made after the completion of
the scheme are inadmissible under rule 801(d)(2)(E). FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(E). See
Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 401-02 (1957) (generally, once coconspirators have
attained central criminal purpose, prosecutor cannot imply a subsidiary conspiracy to con-
ceal if circumstantial evidence merely shows that conspiracy was kept secret); United
States v. Mackey, 571 F.2d 376, 383 (7th Cir. 1978) (if concealment phase is part of con-
spirator's agreement, statements furthering concealment fit within coconspirator
exception); United States v. Floyd, 555 F.2d 45, 48 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 851 (1977)
(prosecutor cannot include in conspiracy any event occurring after main objective of con-
spiracy accomplished, regardless of how proximately related). For a discussion of when
courts deem the conspiracy completed, see MCCORMICK, supra note 4, at 87.
" FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(E). Under the "in furtherance" requirement, the coconspira-
tor's statements must advance the objectives of the conspiracy. WEINSTEIN, note 13 supra, §
801[01] at 801-143. See United States v. Anderson, 642 F.2d 281, 285 (9th Cir. 1981)
(coconspirator's statement identifying defendant as source of heroin, was in furtherance of
plot because made to induce defendant's continued participation in conspiracy). The in fur-
therance requirement guards defendants against idle chatter of criminal partners, misre-
ported or fabricated evidence, and casual admissions of culpability. See, e.g., United States
v. Lieberman, 637 F.2d 95, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1980) (mere casual conversations between cocon-
spirators in presence of nonconspirators amounts to idle chatter and is not in furtherance of
the conspiracy); United States v. Castillo, 615 F.2d 878, 883 (9th Cir. 1980) (coconspirator's
statements to prosecution's witness inadmissible where nothing indicated coconspirator in-
tended to further conspiracy by announcing plan to witness); United States v. Eubanks, 591
F.2d 513, 520 (9th Cir. 1979) (statements not in furtherance of the conspiracy and thus inad-
missible were not intended to induce witness to join conspiracy or to assist conspirators in
achieving objective). Despite attempts to remove the "in furtherance" requirement from the
coconspirator exception, see United States v. Moore, 522 F.2d 1068, 1977 n.5 (9th Cir. 1975);
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 508(b) (1942), the Supreme Court has continued to endorse
the requirement and rule 801(d)(2)(E) expressly retains this prerequisite. See Anderson v.
United States, 417 U.S. 211, 219 (1974); Wong-Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 490 (1963);
Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 443-44 (1949). Some courts construe the require-
ment so broadly, however, that any coconspirator admission related to the joint venture
satisfies the in furtherance requirements. See, e.g., United States v. McGuire, 608 F.2d 1028,
1032 (5th Cir. 1979) (courts should not apply in furtherance requirement too literally); United
States v. Patton, 594 F.2d 444,447 (5th Cir. 1979)(too strict an application of in furtherance re-
quirement would defeat purpose of coconspirator exception). The in furtherance prerequisite
is generally the easiest part of the prosecution's case to satisfy. See Co-Conspirator Declara-
tions, supra note 7, at 290-293; but see United States v. Mangan, 575 F.2d 32, 43-44 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 931 (1978) (court must carefully scrutinize conconspirator statements).
1982]
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spiracy. Rule 801(d)(2)(E), however, fails to express clearly how courts
are to apply the coconspirator exception. 5 Consequently, determining
when the prosecutor has established an adequate foundational case of
conspiracy to satisfy rule 801(d)(2)(E) is an issue upon which federal cir-
cuit courts disagree.'" The circuit courts differ on the appropriate stand-
ard of proof required to satisfy the exception, 7 and the breadth of
testimony the prosecutor can use to satisfy the exception. 8 Doubt also
exists as to the propriety of the judge rather than the jury making the
factual determination of whether the prosecution has met the
exception's three requirements. 9
Before passage of the Federal Rules circuit courts followed one of
two different approaches to determine the admissibility of coconspirator
statements." Under the majority approach the judge and jury employed
a two-step process in which they each participated in the admissibility
determination." In circuits using the two-step process the judge initially
, FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E).
" See Note, Evolution of the Coconspirator Exception to the Hearsay Rule in the
Federal Courts, 16 NEw ENG. L. REV. 617, 621 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Coconspirator
Hearsay Exception].
17 See United States v. Gresko, 632 F.2d 1128, 1131 (4th Cir. 1980) (preponderance stan-
dard); United States v. Jackson, 627 F.2d 1198, 1218-19 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (judge uses
reasonable doubt standard); United States v. Petersen, 611 F.2d 1313, 1330-31 (10th Cir.
1979) (judge uses preponderance standard for ultimate decision); United States v. James,
590 F.2d 575, 579-82 (5th Cir. 1979) (judge uses preponderance standard); United States v.
Santiago, 582 F.2d 1128, 1134 (7th Cir. 1978) (preponderance standard); United States v.
Enright, 579 F.2d 980, 986 (6th Cir. 1978) (preponderance standard); United States v.
Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 768 (9th Cir. 1978) (prima facie standard); United States v. Bell, 573
F.2d 1040, 1044 (8th Cir. 1978) (preponderance standard); United States v. Stanchich, 550
F.2d 1294, 1299 n.4 (2d Cir. 1977) (preponderance standard); United States v. Petrozziello,
548 F.2d 20, 23 (1st Cir. 1977) (preponderance standard); United States v. Trotter, 529 F.2d
806, 811-12 (3d Cir. 1976) (preponderance standard).
" See United States v. Cawley, 630 F.2d 1345, 1350 (9th Cir. 1980) (independent
nonhearsay evidence); United States v. Kendricks, 623 F.2d 1165, 1168 n.5 (6th Cir. 1980)
(judge can consider all evidence including hearsay statements themselves in determining
admissibility); United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 930 (4th Cir. 1980) (in-
dependent nonhearsay evidence); United States v. Tilton, 610 F.2d 302, 306 (5th Cir. 1980)
(independent nonhearsay evidence); United States v. Rios, 611 F.2d 1335, 1340-41, 1340 n.8
(10th Cir. 1979) (independent nonhearsay evidence); United States v. Cambindo Valencia,
609 F.2d 603, 631 (2d Cir. 1979) (independent nonhearsay evidence); United States v.
McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1357 (7th Cir. 1979) (independent nonhearsay evidence); United
States v. Schoenhut, 576 F.2d 1010, 1027 (3d Cir. 1978) (independent nonhearsay evidence);
United States v. Macklin, 573 F.2d 1046, 1048 n.2 (8th Cir. 1978) (independent nonhearsay
evidence); United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 118, 118 n.246 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (indepen-
dent nonhearsay evidence); United States v. Martorano, 557 F.2d 1, 12 (1st Cir.), rehearing
denied, 561 F.2d 406 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 922 (1978) (judge can consider all
evidence including hearsay statements themselves in determining admissibility).
19 See text accompanying notes 48-64 infra.
Compare United States v. Lawson, 523 F.2d 804, 806 (5th Cir. 1975) (judge and jury
share authority in admissibility decision), with United States v. Nardone, 127 F.2d 521, 523
(2d Cir. 1942) (judge alone has complete authority to make admissibility decision).
21 See United States v. James, 576 F.2d 1121, 1127 (5th Cir. 1978), rehearing en banc,
590 F.2d 575, 578 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979), citing Apollo v. United States,
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decided whether the prosecution adequately had established by indepen-
dent evidence the coconspirator exception's substantive requirements.'
If the prosecution made this prima facie showing, the judge then in-
structed the jury on the conditional status of the coconspirator declara-
tions that the prosecution was about to present.' If the prosecutor failed
to make the requisite prima facie showing, the judge faced three alter-
natives.24 The judge could instruct the prosecutor to rearrange the order
of proof to establish the necessary showing, 5 conditionally admit the
prosecutor's proposed evidence" and advise the jury accordingly," or ex-
clude any additional evidence and admonish the jury to disregard all
statements previously heard.'
In the second step of the admissibility determination, the jury made
the ultimate decision whether to admit the coconspirator statements.
2 9
476 F.2d 156, 163 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Geaney, 417 F.2d 1116, 1120 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied sub nom., Lynch v. United States, 397 U.S. 1028 (1970); Carbo v. United States,
314 F.2d 718, 737 (9th Cir. 1963).
' See United States v. James, 576 F.2d 1121, 1127 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Geaney, 417 F.2d 1116, 1120 (2d Cir. 1969); text accompanying notes 11-14 supra.
' See United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575, 578 (5th Cir. 1979). After the prosecutor
makes a prima facie showing of a conspiracy, the judge instructs the jury to consider the
hearsay against the defendant only if the jury also determines that the prosecutor established
the foundational requirements of the coconspirator exception. Id.; Myers v. United States,
377 F.2d 412, 417-19 (5th Cir. 1967).
See notes 25-28 infra.
See United States v. Turner, 528 F.2d 143, 162 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 996
(1975) (separate opinion, Kilkenny, J.). Rule 611(a) retains trial judges' common law discre-
tion to regulate the order of proof. FED. R. Evm. 611(a). See United States v. Vinson, 606
F.2d 149, 151-153 (6th Cir. 1979) (judge can require all nonhearsay evidence first, conditional-
ly admit coconspirator statements subject to later proof of conspiracy, or order "mini hear-
ing" on admissibility issue before any evidence admitted).
' See United States v. Turner, 528 F.2d 143, 162 (9th Cir. 1975) (separate opinion,
Kilkenny, J.) (trial judge could admit evidence subject to motion to strike if prosecution
subsequently failed to fulfill coconspirator exception's substantive requirements). The judge
admits the evidence under the stipulation that the prosecutor later connect up by evidence
of conspiracy the conditionally admitted coconspirator statements. Id. Courts allow prose-
cutors to enter evidence conditionally (subject to an order to strike) to facilitate the prosecu-
tion's proof and save court time. FED. R. EvID. 611(a). For example, a prosecutor may have a
witness testify and want to use the coconspirator statements against all three defendants,
A, B, and C. At the time the witness testifies, however, the prosecutor only may have
established the foundational requirements of 801(d)(2)(E) as to A and B. Therefore, the
witness' statements are only admissible against A and B. Nevertheless, the judge can allow
the admission of the statements against A, B, and C, but subject to a motion to strike
against C if the prosecutor does not subsequently satisfy rule 801(d)(2}(E)'s requirements as
to C.
. See United States v. Tilton, 610 F.2d 302, 306 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v.
James, 590 F.2d 575, 582 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 768 (9th Cir.
1978) citing United States v. Knight, 416 F.2d 1181, 1185 (9th Cir. 1969) (trial judge has
discretion to admit evidence subject to motion to strike if prosecution's proof of conspiracy
is insufficient).
See generally Morgan, Functions of Judge and Jury in the Determination of
Preliminary Questions of Fact, 43 HARV. L. REV. 165 (1929).
" See United States v. Santiago, 582 F.2d 1128, 1132 (7th Cir. 1978).
19821
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Admissibility became a jury question once the judge unconditionally ad-
mitted the coconspirator statement or found that the prosecutor ade-
quately "connected up" the coconspirator statement by proving the ex-
ception's substanative requirements. The jury's admissibility deter-
mination was distinct from the judge's.3 1 The judge only had to find a
prima facie case of conspiracy.2 The jury, on the other hand, had to find
the existence of a conspiracy established beyond a reasonable doubt
before the evidence became admissible.13 In determining whether a con-
spiracy existed, the jury could use only evidence independent of the
coconspirator's statements. 4 Upon acceptance of the coconspirator's
statements into evidence, the jury then determined how much weight to
assign the statements when deciding the guilt of the defendant. 5
Courts rejecting the traditional two-step process involving both
judge and jury delegated to the judge full authority to make the admissi-
bility ruling. Resting the determination solely with the judge coincided
' See id.; United States v. James, 576 F.2d 1121, 1127 (5th Cir. 1978), rehearing en
banc, 590 F.2d 575 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979).
31 See United States v. Santiago, 582 F.2d at 1132 citing United States v. Santos, 385
F.2d 43, 45 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 954 (1967). The jury's determination involved the
complex task of sorting through all the evidence admitted and partitioning off the often pre-
judicial coconspirator statements. 582 F.2d at 1132. Without considering the coconspirator
statements, the jury then had to determine whether the remaining nonhearsay evidence
established the coconspirator exceptions preliminary requirements beyond a reasonable
doubt. Al. If the jury found affirmatively, the coconspirator statements then became ad-
missible for consideration upon the ultimate issues. Id. Cases involving multiple defendants
in which the jury was to consider the statements against some defendants and not others
further complicated the jury's determination. In such cases, the court instructions
stipulated that if the jury first found the statements admissible, the jury could then con-
sider the evidence only against certain defendants and not against others. Nash v. United
States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1006 (2d Cir. 1932). As Learned Hand pointed out, correctly categoriz-
ing the evidence according to the individual defendant amounts to mental gymnastics
beyond the capability of jurors. Id- at 1007. The belief that jury instructions can eliminate
this confusion and accompanying prejudicial effect in such deliberations is questionable.
Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949).
1 See United States v. James, 576 F.2d 1121, 1127 (5th Cir. 1978), rehearing en banc,
590 F.2d 575 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979).
1 See United States v. Santiago, 582 F.2d 1128, 1131-32 (7th Cir. 1978); United States
v. Enright, 579 F.2d 980, 983 (6th Cir. 1978); United States v. James, 576 F.2d 1121, 1127 (5th
Cir. 1978), rehearing en banc, 590 F.2d 575 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979);
United States v. Bell, 573 F.2d 1040, 1044 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Petrozziello, 548
F.2d 20, 23 (1st Cir. 1977); Carbo v. United States, 314 F.2d 718, 737 (9th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964).
u See J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, 1 WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE 104105] at 104-44.9 (1979).
See generally Procedure and Standard of Proof, supra note 10.
36 See United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 186, 203 (4th Cir.}, cert. denied, 426 U.S. 922
(1976). Although the Fourth Circuit decided Jones after enactment of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, the court relied on prior case law to support the single-step judge determination.
Id. Other circuits also endorsed having the judge alone determine admissibility. See United
States v. Pisciotta, 469 F.2d 329, 332-33 (10th Cir. 1972); United States v. Bey, 437 F.2d 188,
191-92 (3d Cir. 1971); Carbo v. United States, 314 F.2d 718, 736-37 (9th Cir. 1963); United
States v. Nardone, 127 F.2d 521, 523 (2d Cir. 19742).
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with the general custom of allowing the court to rule on the admissibility
of evidence."' Circuits delegating the decision to the judge reasoned that
a bifurcated decisional process prejudiced the defendant when the
preliminary and ultimate issues of the existence of a conspiracy cor-
responded.- Courts disregarding the two-step process reasoned that the
judge should decide all factual issues which depend on the competency of
the evidence. 9
The Federal Rules of Evidence attempted to codify the existing case
law principles for determining preliminary questions of fact, such as the
existence of a conspiracy." Subdivision (a) of Federal Rule 104 imposes
upon the judge the duty to decide preliminary questions of fact depen-
dent on the competency of the evidence." Under rule 104(b) the jury is to
determine preliminary questions of relevancy dependent upon the fulfill-
ment of a condition of fact.4" Rules 104(a) and (b), however, have not
resolved conclusively whether the judge or the jury should determine
I See generally Maguire & Epstein, Preliminary Questions of Fact in Determining
the Admissibility of Evidence, 40 HARv..L. REv. 392 (1926) [hereinafter cited as Preliminary
Question].
" See United States v. Pisciotta, 469 F.2d 329, 333 (10th Cir. 1972); Carbo v. United
States, 314 F.2d 718, 737 (9th Cir. 1963). In Carbo, the bifurcated process threatened the
defendant with prejudice because of the confusing directions the jury had to follow in deter-
mining admissibility. Id. See note 31 supra (note describes process jury had to adhere to).
"' See Carbo v. United States, 314 F.2d 718, 736 (9th Cir. 1963); United States v. Den-
nis, 183 F.2d 201, 231 (2d Cir. 1950), affd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). The Ninth Circuit in Carbo
adopted the practice stated in Dennis of having the judge decide issues of fact on which the
competency of the evidence depends. 314 F.2d at 737.
"0 See FED. R. Evm. 104, Advisory Committee's Note. The Advisory Committee stated
that when the admissibility of evidence depends on the existence of a condition, then the
judge must determine the existence of the condition. Id. At common law, the judge alone
determined preliminary questions of fact relating to technical rules. United States v. Geaney,
417 F.2d 1116, 1120 (2d Cir. 1969).
" The pertinent parts of rule 104 provide:
(a) Questions of admissibility generally. Preliminary questions concerning the
qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admis-
sibility of evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the provisions of
subdivision (b). In making its determination it is not bound by the rules of
evidence except those with respect to privileges.
(b) Relevancy conditioned on fact. When the relevancy of evidence depends upon
the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or subject to,
the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the
condition.
(c) Hearing of jury. Hearings on the admissibility of confessions shall in all cases
be conducted out of the hearing of the jury. Hearings on other preliminary mat-
ters shall be so conducted when the interests of justice require or, when an accused
is a witness, if he so requests ....
FED. R. EVID. 104.
1' FED. R. EvID. 104(b). See FEDERAL RULES MANUAL, supra note 9. "Relevancy" is a
term of art describing the probative value of the evidence. Id. at 37. "Competency," on the
other hand, describes whether a particular piece of evidence fits into a technical rule of
evidence such as witness competency or the hearsay exceptions. Id. Commentators have
also used "competency" as a term of art representing all the technical rules of evidence. Id.
19821
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA WREVIEW
the ultimate admissibility of coconspirator statements.43 Coconspirator
statements are suited both to classification under rule 104(a), as depen-
dent on the competency of the evidence, and under 104(b), as dependent
on a finding of conditional relevancy." Federal Rule 104 failed to resolve
this classification dilemma inherent in determining the admissibility of
coconspirator statements.4" Likewise, rule 801(d)(2)(E) is silent on who
should determine whether the prosecutor has made the proper
showing."
Until 1977, circuit courts avoided applying rule 104 to the cocon-
spirator exception and continued to endorse their pre-Rules procedure.
The First Circuit initiated the application of rule 104 in United States v.
Petrozziello.41 The Petrozziello court determined that rule 104(a) gave
the judge the final and only voice in determining the ultimate ad-
missibility of coconspirator statements. Although the First Circuit
avoided discussing 104(a) within rule 104's framework of competence and
conditional relevancy,49 other circuits approvingly cited Petrozziello for
applying rule 104(a).5 ° Since Petrozziello, the circuits that previously
allocated the admissibility determination to both judge and jury have
followed the First Circuit's lead and have shifted full authority to the
judge."1
" United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575, 579 (5th Cir. 1979) (neither language of rule
104 nor Advisory Committee's Notes indicate whether coconspirator statements fall under
rule 104(a) as competency questions or rule 104(b) as conditional relevancy questions);
United States v. Enright, 579 F.2d 980, 984 (6th Cir. 1978) (unclear whether rule 104(a) or
104(b) governs admissibility); see Procedure and Standard of Proof, supra note 11, at 581.
" United States v. James, 576 F.2d 1121, 1128-29 (5th Cir. 1978), rehearing en banc, 590
F.2d 575 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979). Advocates of rule 104(a) frame the ad-
missibility question in terms of competency, inquiring whether the conspiracy and the ac-
cused's participation in the conspiracy render the hearsay declarations sufficiently reliable
to warrant admission. United States v. Enright, 579 F.2d 980, 984 (6th Cir. 1978). Pro-
ponents of rule 104(b), in contrast, couch the admissibility issue in terms of relevancy, in-
quiring whether declarant's statements largely are irrelevant unless the defendant and
declarant are joint members of a criminal conspiracy. Id.
'" See generally Comment, The Impact of Federal Rule of Evidence 104 on the
Coconspirator Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 28 EMORY L.J. 1115 (1979) [hereinafter cited
as Exception to the Hearsay Rule]. Apparently, some legislative discussion centered on the
difficulties of applying the coconspirator exception although the rules do not reflect this con-
cern. Id. at 1119 n.27.
48 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E). See United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575, 578 (5th Cir.
1979).
', 548 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1977).
Id. at 23.
" See notes 40 and 42 supra.
See United States v. Andrews, 585 F.2d 961, 965-66 (10th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Santiago, 582 F.2d 1128, 1134 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Bell, 573 F.2d 1040, 1043 (8th
Cir. 1978).
51 See United States v. Jackson, 627 F.2d 1198, 1217-1218 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (D.C. Circuit
based decision to follow 104(a) on Fifth Circuit's policy reasons and Seventh Circuit's
characterization of admissibility as mainly question of competency); United States v. James,
590 F.2d 575, 579"(5th Cir. 1979) (Fifth Circuit decided that a rule which puts admissibility of
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Currently all the circuit courts agree in endorsing the judge as the
final arbiter of the admissibility question." Although commentators
dispute the merits of having the judge rather than the jury determine
admissibility,' placing the decision on the judge is the better approach.
Practical reasons as well as careful analysis of the issue support this con-
clusion. Having the judge determine admissibility eradicates the in-
herent difficulty expressed in United States v. James0 of saddling the
jury with both the admissibility question and the ultimate determination
of guilt or innocence.5 The Fifth Circuit in James noted the danger that
the jury might convict the defendant on the basis of the coconspirator
statements themselves without first dealing with the admissibility ques-
tion. 6 Moreover, the trained legal mind of a judge can better resolve the
admissibility question which involves applying technical rules of
evidence Preliminary questions for the jury under 104(b) usually only
contemplate common sense reasoning that rarely threatens the defen-
dant with prejudice.'
coconspirator statements in jury's hands fails to avoid danger that jury might convict on
basis of statements without first deciding admissibility question); United States v.
Andrews, 585 F.2d 961, 965 (10th Cir. 1978) (Tenth Circuit, like the Eighth, adopted P.etroz-
ziello without considering interplay between 104(a) and 104(b)); United States v. Santiago,
582 F.2d 1128, 1133 (7th Cir. 1978) (Seventh Circuit considered admissibility a matter of com-
petency under 104(a), not conditional relevancy under 104(b)); United States v. Enright, 579
F.2d 980, 984 (6th Cir. 1978) (Sixth Circuit decided that admissibility is more question of
basic reliability and fairness of admitting evidence than relevancy question of whether
evidence has tendency to make fact in issue more or less probable than fact would be
without evidence); United States v. Bell, 573 F.2d 1040, 1043 (8th Cir. 1978) (Eighth Circuit
merely adopted 104(a) on strength of Petrozziello and failed to consider framework of 104(a)
and 104(b)); text accompanying notes 40-45 supra.
1 See United States v. Jackson, 627 F.2d 1198, 1217-1218 (D.C. Cir. 1980); United
States v. James, 590 F.2d 575, 579 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Andrews, 585 F.2d 961,
965 (10th Cir. 1978); United States v. Santiago, 582 F.2d 1128, 1133 (7th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Enright, 579 F.2d 980, 984 (6th Cir. 1978); United States v. Bell, 573 F.2d 1040, 1043
(8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20, 23 (1st Cir. 1977); United States v.
Jones, 542 F.2d 186, 203 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v. Bey, 437 F.2d 188, 191-92 (3d Cir.
1971); Carbo v. United States, 314 F.2d 718, 736-37 (9th Cir. 1963); United States v. Nardone,
127 F.2d 521, 523 (2d Cir. 1942). See text accompanying notes 40-63 supra and infra; but see
text accompanying notes 163-167 infra (although judge has sole authority in admissibility
determination, some circuits still send question to jury for ultimate determination).
I Compare 4 J. WEINSTEIN, EvmE.NCE 104[05] at 104-39, 104-43 (1975) (rule 104(b)
governs admissibility of coconspirator declarations) and Kessler, The Treatment of
Preliminary Issues of Fact in Conspiracy Litigations: Putting the Conspiracy Back into the
Coconspirator Rule, 5 HOFSTRA L. Rav. 77, 98 (1976) (jury must decide preliminary questions
of fact) with Procedure and Standard of Proof, supra note 10, at 587 (preliminary review by
judge is more reasonable and required by 104(a)) and Exception to the Hearsay Rule, supra
note 45, at 1149 (courts properly moving towards judicial determination).
u United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1979).
" Id. at 579. See notes 31 and 38 supra.
5 Id.
57Id.
" 28 U.S.C. app., Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules [of Evid.], Rule 104,
Subdivision (b (1976).
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The analysis in United States v. Enright9 further supports applica-
tion of 104(a) to determine the admissibility of a coconspirator's out-of-
court statements. 0 The Enright court compared 104(a) with 104(b) and
concluded that the admissibility of a coconspirator's statements more
closely resembles a 104(a) hearsay issue than a 104(b) relevancy issue."
The Sixth Circuit reasoned that admissibility of coconspirator out-of-
court statements was mainly a question of the reliability and fairness of
the evidence.2 Since the purpose of the admissibility determination is to
protect an accused from unreliable and potentially prejudicial state-
ments, the Enright court held that the admissibility of out-of-court
statements is a question of competency under 104(a).6 3
Although adoption of 104(a) resolved the issue of who should arbi-
trate the admissibility of coconspirator statements, rule 104(a) created
two new issues. These new issues concern the type of evidence that
judges may consider in determining the application of 801(d)(2(E),64 and
the appropriate standard of proof that prosecutors must satisfy before
courts may admit coconspirator statements into evidence." Since rules
104(a) and 801(d)(2)(E) do not expressly resolve these questions, courts
have had to determine whether the two rules' lack of mandate implictly
endorses existing case law or directs the adoption of new procedures."
With respect to the issue of what types of evidence judges may con-
sider in making the threshold conspiracy determination under 104(a), cir-
cuit courts have had to decide whether judges may only consider inde-
pendent nonhearsay evidence or whether judges may consider all prof-
fered evidence, regardless of its hearsay nature. In the pre-rule 104(a)
decision of Glasser v. United States,8 the Supreme Court prohibited
judges from considering the coconspirator statements themselves when
determining the availability of the coconspirator hearsay exception to
those statements. 9 Under the Glasser requirement, judges may only
consider independent evidence of the conspiracy in determining the ad-
missibility of out-of-court statements of coconspirators." Use of hearsay
5 579 F.2d 980 (6th Cir. 1978).
'o Id. at 984.
61 Id.; see Coconspirator Hearsay Exception, supra note 16, at 626.
579 F.2d at 984.
See Exception to the Hearsay Rule, supra note 43, at 1125.
See text accompanying notes 67-97 infra.
See text accompanying notes 98-185 infra.
United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575, 578-81 (5th Cir. 1979).
See Co-Conspirator Declarations, supra note 7, at 296-99; Exception to the Hearsay
Rule, supra note 43, at 1135-38.
315 U.S. 60 (1942) (judge can use only evidence independent of hearsay itself in mak-
ing preliminary determination of admissibility of coconspirator statements).




in admissibility decisions creates the potential for "bootstrapping,"7 '
whereby a prosecutor conceivably could establish the prerequisite con-
spiracy by the very hearsay statement he seeks to admit.72 With the ex-
ception of evidentiary rules regarding privileges, however, rule 104(a)
releases a judge from the strictures of the rules of evidence." Rule 104(a)
seemingly permits judges to consider hearsay and other inadmissible
evidence in making admissibility determinations under the rule 104(a).74
Rule 104(a), therefore, arguably authorizes judges to do exactly what
Glasser prohibitied.
Circuit courts have reached varying results on the compatability of
Glasser and rule 104(a). The First 5 and Eighth ' Circuits serve as
analytical extremes. In United States v. Martorano7 the First Circuit
reasoned that 104(a) overruled Glasser.8 The Martorano court held that
the judge may consider out-of-court statements that the prosecutor
seeks to admit under 801(d)(2)(E) in making the preliminary determina-
tion of whether the requisite 801(d)(2)(E) conspiracy exists. 9 The court
observed that except for rules regarding privilege, the language of
104(a) expressly released judges from abiding by the rules of evidence
when considering questions of competency." Furthermore, the court
," See United States v. Macklin, 573 F.2d 1046, 1048 n.2 (8th Cir. 1978).
"Bootstrapping" means that the prosecutor lays the foundation for the introduction of the.
coconspirator statements by relying on the coconspirator statements themselves as proof of
the conspiracy. United States v. DeFillipo, 590 F.2d 1228, 1236 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 442
U.S. 920 (1979).
" United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20, 23 n.2 (1st Cir. 1977).
,' FED. R. Evm. 104(a); see United States v. Santiago, 582 F.2d 1128, 1133 n.11 (7th Cir.
1978) (discussing conflict between Glasser and rule 104(a)).
' United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d at 23 n.2 (1st Cir. 1977).
' See United States v. Martorano, 557 F.2d 1, 12 (1st Cir.), rehearing denied, 561 F.2d
406 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 922 (1978) (judge can consider all evidence including
hearsay in deciding admissibility question). The Sixth Circuit also follows the First Circuit's
approach. See United States v. Kendricks, 623 F.2d 1165, 1168 n.5 (6th Cir. 1980) (judges
need not predicate findings solely on evidence independent of hearsay); United States v.
Vinson, 606 F.2d 149, 151-53 (6th Cir. 1979) (judge can consider hearsay statements
themselves in resolving preliminary question of admissibility).
7" See United States v. Macklin, 573 F.2d 1046, 1048 n.2 (8th Cir. 1978) (bootstrapping
is unwarranted and was not contemplated in enactment of rule 104).
" 557 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.), rehearing denied, 561 F.2d 406 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 922 (1978) (conspiracy case reiterating Petrozziello holding and stating that Federal
Rules of Evidence overruled Glasser's independent evidence requirement).
78 Id. at 12.
79 Id.
"Id. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 175 (1973) (where judge determines
admissibility, exclusionary rules aside from rules of privilege should not apply; judge should
have power to receive evidence and give evidence such weight as his judgment and ex-
perience counsel); United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575, 591-92, 592 n.9 (5th Cir. 1979)
(Tjoflat, J., concurring) (language of rule 104(a) and Advisory Committee's Notes empower
judge to consider proffered statements in determining admissibility of coconspirator
statements).
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reasoned that judges would recognize the inherent weaknesses in the
hearsay statements." The First Circuit consequently reduced Glasser to
a warning that hearsay statements ordinarily have questionable credibil-
ity.
82
A majority of circuits continue to adhere to Glasser's requirement
that courts use only evidence independent of the coconspirator's out-of-
court statements in determining the application of the rule 801(d)(2)(E)."
Some circuit courts, however, have endorsed Glasser's independent
evidence requirement without specifically considering the impact of
104(a). 4 In contrast, the Seventh8 and Eighth" Circuits have considered
and openly condemned the Martorano standard. In United States v.
Macklin, 7 the Eighth Circuit noted the First Circuit's decision in Mar-
torano, but rejected the suggestion in Martorano that under 104(a)
judges may consider out-of-court statements themselves in determining
the statements' admissibility.88 Prior to Macklin, the Eighth Circuit
stressed Glasser as an important safeguard to the reliability of evidence
admitted at trial. The need to guarantee the reliability of coconspirator
81 United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575, 579 (5th Cir. 1979).
See 557 F.2d at 12; United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d at 23 n.2. The First Cir-
cuit subsequently endorsed Martorano in United States v. Mackedon, 562 F.2d 103, 105 (1st
Cir. 1977) (admissibility determination based on all the evidence). In United States v. Nardi,
633 F.2d 972 (1st Cir. 1980), however, the court seemed to back away from the Martorano
determination. Id. at 975. Without citing Martorano or rule 104(a) the First Circuit conclud-
ed that the prosecution presented sufficient independent evidence to meet the
preponderance standard. Id.
" See United States v. Cawley, 630 F.2d 1345, 1350 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Troung Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 930 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v. Rios, 611 F.2d 1335,
1340-41, 1341 n.8 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 101 S.C. 3054 (1981); United States v. Tilton,
610 F.2d 302, 306 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Cambindo Valencia, 609 F.2d 603, 631 (2d
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 940 (1980); United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1357
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 833 (1979); United States v. Schoenhut, 576 F.2d 1010, 1027
(3d Cir.) cert. denied, 439 U.S. 964 (1978); United States v. Macklin, 573 F.2d 1045, 1048
n.2 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 118, 118 n.246 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
The District of Columbia Circuit has not addressed the independent evidence issue since
enactment of the rules. Therefore, although the court decided Haldeman before the rules
become effective, Haldeman remains persuasive authority. See United States v. Jackson,
627 F.2d 1198, 1216 n.34 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (court held it was not necessary to decision in
Jackson to determine effect of Federal Rules on Glasser).
" See United States v. Trowery, 542 F.2d 623, 626-27 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1104 (1977); United States v. Wood, 550 F.2d 435, 442 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Stanchich, 550 F.2d 1294, 1299 n.4 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Stroupe, 538 F.2d 1063,
1065 (4th Cir. 1976).
1 See United States v. Papia, 560 F.2d 827, 835 (7th Cir. 1977) (court remains mindful
of duty to scrutinize strictly sufficiency of only nonhearsay evidence establishing conspiracy
and accused's connection to conspiracy).
" See United States v. Macklin, 573 F.2d 1046, 1048 n.2 (8th Cir. 1978).
573 F.2d 1046 (8th Cir. 1978).
Id. at 1048 n.2.
See United States v. Bell, 573 F.2d 1040, 1044 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Lam-
bros, 564 F.2d 26, 29-30 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1074 (1978); United States v.
Scholle, 553 F.2d 1109, 1117 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 940 (1978).
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statements justifies the majority's continued adherence to Glasser." The
independent evidence standard allows the judge to determine if suffi-
cient corroborating evidence of conspiracy exists to insure reliability.'
Rather than disregarding either 104(a)'s language or Glasser's in-
structions, the Fifth Circuit in United States v. James92 integrated the
two rules. The James court held that rule 104(a) allows the trial judge to
consider hearsay and other inadmissible evidence of conspiracy in deter-
mining the availiability of 801(d)(2)(E). 3 The Fifth Circuit stipulated,
however, that the hearsay statements considered in the rule 801(d)(2)(E)
determination must differ from the statements sought to be introduced
at trial under 801(d)(2)(E). 4 The court concluded that 104(a) did not mean
to imply that a judge may consider the very out-of-court statements
sought to be admitted under 801(d)(2)(E). Rather, the judge may con-
sider in determining the availability of 801(d)(2)E) only those hearsay
statements that differ from the out-of-court statements ultimately to be
introduced at trial. The Fifth Circuit's interpretation guards against
"bootstrapping" while giving force to both Glasser and 104(a).97
In addition to the court's lack of concensus as to the type of evidence
that the factfinder may use, the circuits are divided as to the quantum of
proof the prosecution must present before coconspirator statements are
admissible. 9 Rule 104(a)'s insistence on a one-party determination of ad-
missibility dictates a need to change the quantum of proof in such deter-
minations.9 When the judge's determination is the only determination
made, the prima facie standard used at common law fails to protect
defendants adequately. 10 Accepting coconspirator statements into
evidence following a mere prima facie showing risks subjecting the ac-
cused to unreliable evidence. 9 ' Moreover, continuing use of the prima
See Exception to the Hearsay Rule, supra note 45, at 1137-38.
'1 Id.
" 576 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1978), rehearing en banc, 590 F.2d 575, 581 (5th Cir.), cert.





" Id. Subdivision (a) of 104 makes no distinction between hearsay offered for admission
and other hearsay related to the question of admissibility. FED. R. EVID. 104(a). The Fifth
Circuit reads this distinction into rule 104(a). See United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575, 581
(5th Cir. 1979).
" See text accompanying notes 98-185 infra.
" See United States v. Enright, 579 F.2d 980, 985 (6th Cir. 1978) (framers of 104(a) did
not intend for judge to employ prima facie test for resolving preliminary questions under
that section).
10 See United States v. James, 576 F.2d 1121, 1130 (5th Cir. 1978), rehearing en banc,
590 F.2d 595 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979).
... Id. A mere prima facie showing of the coconspirator exception's substantive require-
ments would have the unwanted effect of elevating the statements to admissible evidence.
Id.
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facie standard without the jury applying additionally the beyond a
reasonable doubt standard would broadly expand the scope of the cocon-
spirator exception.10" To avoid expansion of the coconspirator exception
and accomodate the judge's new role in determining admissibility, all the
circuits except one" 3 have abandoned the initial prima facie test and
have adopted stricter standards."' Eight circuits have modified their re-
quisite standards of proof since Congress enacted the Federal Rules of
Evidence.1 5 Three circuits have reaffirmed their standards used prior to
10 United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20, 23 (1st Cig. 1977). The Supreme Court and
various commentators have expressed concern about expanding the coconspirator exception
and emphasize the need to restrain the breadth of the exception. See Krulewitch v. United
States, 336 U.S. 440, 443-44 (1949); Levie, Hearsay and Conspiracy: A Reexamination of the
Co-Conspirators' Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1159, 1170 (1954)
[hereinafter cited as Hearsay and Conspiracy]; Oakley, From Hearsay to Eternity: Pen-
dency and the Co-Conspirator Exception in California-Fact Fiction and a Novel Ap-
proach, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 23 (1975). Overexpansion of the exception threatens the
accused with confrontation of the prejudicial impact of unreliable evidence. See Davenport,
The Confrontation Clause and the Co-Conspirator Exception in Criminal Prosecutions: A
Functional Analysis, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1378, 1384 (1972).
103 See United States v. Batimana, 623 F.2d 1366, 1368 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1038 (1980). The Ninth Circuit expressly has retained the prima facie standard. United
States v. Testa, 548 F.2d 847, 853 n.2 (9th Cir. 1977). The Ninth Circuit requires the prosecu-
tion to present sufficient, substantial evidence to establish a prima facie case of conspiracy
and the defendant's involvement in the conspiracy before the coconspirator exception ap-
plies. United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 768 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981
(1978); United States v. Testa, 548 F.2d 847, 853 n.2 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Calaway, 524 F.2d 609, 612 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 967 (1976). The Ninth Cir-
cuit reasoned that the Supreme Court's sufficient, substantial evidence requirement in
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 701 n.14 (1974) implied a prima facie showing. United
States v. Testa, 548 F.2d 847, 852-53 (9th Cir. 1977). See notes 112-122 and accompanying
text infra. Since the Nixon Court relied exclusively on circuit court cases employing the
prima facie standard, including two Ninth Circuit cases, to substantiate the Court's suffi-
cient, substantial evidence requirement, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Court's
language required a prima facie showing. Id.
14 See United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20, 23 (1st Cir. 1977). The Petrozziello
court reasoned that prior to enactment of rule 104(a), the judge's use of the prima facie
standard was adequate since the jury ultimately determined admissibility based on the
reasonable doubt standard. Id. Under 104(a), however, since the judge's determination is
final, a higher standard must be implicit in the judge's new role. Id. The court therefore
adopted the preponderance of the evidence standard. Id.
"I5 See United States v. Jackson, 627 F.2d 1198, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (judge initially
should use substantial independent evidence standard for conditionally admitted
coconspirator statements and then reevaluate admissibility question using all the evidence
to determine whether jury might fairly conclude guilt beyond reasonable doubt); United
States v. Petersen, 611 F.2d 1313, 1330-31 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 905 (1980)
(judge should base decision on preponderance of evidence); United States v. James, 590 F.2d
575, 580-83 (5th Cir. 1979) (judge should use preponderance of evidence standard for
ultimate test of admissibility); United States v. Santiago, 582 F.2d 1128, 1134 (7th Cir. 1978)
(adopted preponderance of evidence standard); United States v. Enright, 579 F.2d 980, 986
(6th Cir. 1978) (adopted preponderance of evidence standard); United States v. Bell, 573 F.2d
1040, 1044 (8th Cir. 1978) (adopted preponderance of evidence standard); United States v.
Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20, 23 (1st Cir. 1977) (adopted preponderance of evidence standard);
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adoption of the rules.' 8 The standards of proof used today include prima
facie,'' preponderance,' 8 substantial independent evidence," 9 and
beyond a reasonable doubt."0 The standards imposed should be strict
enough to protect the defendant adequately, yet not so broad as to ex-
clude trustworthy, relevant evidence."'
The coconspirator exception rules are silent on which standard of
proof the evidence of conspiracy must satisfy."' The United States
Supreme Court has provided little guidance. The Glasser Court con-
spicuously failed to designate the standard of proof aliunde' necessary
for admissibility."" The Supreme Court added to the uncertainty con-
cerning the standard of proof aliunde in United States v. Nixon"' im-
mediately prior to enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Nix-
on Court stated in dictum that the prosecution must make a "sufficient
showing, by independent evidence ... " before coconspirator statements
are admissible."' In an accompanying footnote, the Court stated that "as
a preliminary matter, there must be substantial, independent evidence ...
to take the question to the jury.""'
Circuit courts have reacted to the confusing dicta in several ways."
Some circuits have recited the Nixon substantial independent evidence
language but have not adopted the dicta as a standard." 9 Other circuits
United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 186, 203 (4th Cir. 1976) (adopted preponderance of evidence
standard).
"' United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 768-69 (9th Cir. 1978) (reaffirming prima facie
standard); United States v. Stanchich, 550 F.2d 1294, 1299 n.4 (2d Cir. 1977)Y(reaffirming
preponderance of evidence standard); United States v. Trotter, 529 F.2d 806, 811-12 (3d Cir.
1976) (reaffirming preponderance standard).
", See text accompanying notes 163-170 infra.
' See text accompanying notes 146-162 infra.
'n See text accompanying notes 123-145 infra.
", See text accompanying notes 171-185 infra.
.. See United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575, 580 (5th Cir. 1979).
"' See FED. R. EvID. 801(d)2)(E); FED. R. Evw. 104(a) & (b); note 7 & 41 supra.
", See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. at 74-75. "Proof aliunde" refers to the inde-
pendent, nonhearsay evidence necessary to constitute a threshold showing. See id.
11, Id.
115 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
' Id. at 701 (footnote omitted).
'" Id. at 701 n.14.
11 See Bergman, The Coconspirator's Exception" Defining the Standard of the Inde-
pendent Evidence Test Under the New Rules of Evidence, 5 HOFSTRA. L. REV. 99, 103 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as The Coconspirators'Exception]. The meaning of Chief Justice Burger's
reference in Nixon to substantial independent evidence to take the question to the jury is
unclear. If the Court intended "substantial" to mean "reasonable doubt," the Court express-
ly could have said so. Id. If the Court equated "substantial" with "less than a reasonable
doubt," then the Court should not have spoken of enough "independent evidence" to "take
the question to the jury." Id.
"' See, e.g., United States v. Stroupe, 538 F.2d 1063, 1065 (4th Cir. 1976) (substantial in-
dependent evidence language is dictum); United States v. Wiley, 519 F.2d 1348, 1350-51 (2d
Cir. 1975) (substantial independent evidence language in Nixon is "pure dictum").
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have equated the substantial independent evidence language with the
prima facie standard."' Since all the circuit court cases cited in the Nix-
on footnote as authority for the substantial independent evidence re-
quirement applied the prima facie test, the interpretation of substantial
independent evidence as a prima facie standard has support. 2' Notice-
ably absent from the Nixon Court's list of authority are any circuits that
had previously applied the preponderance of the evidence standard to
the coconspirator exception.22
Only three circuits utilize the substantial independent evidence stan-
dard."n The Fifth'24 and Tenth2 5 Circuits use the substantial independent
evidence standard in the preliminary step of their admissibility deter-
mination.2 The District of Columbia Circuit also uses the substantial in-
dependent evidence standard but only when the court admits cocon-
spirator statements conditionally." Absent conditionally admitted
coconspirator statements, the District of Columbia,l" like seven other
circuits,2 9 determines admissibility in a one-step judidical determination
"' See, e.g., United States v. Dixon, 562 F.2d 1138, 1141 (9th Cir. 1977), cert denied,
435 U.S. 927 (1978) (substantial independent evidence means enough evidence to make prima
facie case); United States v. Stroupe, 538 F.2d 1063, 1065 (4th Cir. 1976) (Fourth Circuit has
expressed substantial independent evidence language before in terms of prima facie proof of
conspiracy but also in terms of proof by fair preponderance of independent evidence).
121 See 418 U.S. at 701 n.14 citing United States v. Vaught, 485 F.2d 320, 323 (4th Cir.
1973); United States v. Morton, 483 F.2d 573, 576 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Spanos,
462 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Santos,.385 F.2d 43, 45 (7th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 954 (1968); United States v. Hoffa, 349 F.2d 20, 41-42 (6th Cir. 1965),
affd on other ground, 385 U.S. 293 (1966); Carbo v. United States, 314 F.2d 718, 737 (9th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964). See also United States v. Trotter, 529 F.2d 806,
811-12 (3d Cir. 1976).
" See 418 U.S. at 701 n.14; United States v. Trotter, 529 F.2d 806, 812 (3d Cir. 1976);
United States v. Wiley, 519 F.2d 1348, 1350-51 (2d Cir. 1975). The Third Circuit recognized
that the Supreme Court's failure to cite the Second and Third Circuits may indicate the
Court's intention to overrule sub silentio the preponderance test used by both circuits. 529
F.2d at 812. The Second Circuit in Wiley reasoned'that because the Supreme Court after
Nixon refused to grant certiorari to several Second Circuit cases in which the court applied
the fair preponderance standard, the Supreme Court in Nixon had not intended to overrule
the preponderance standard. 519 F.2d at 1351,
" See United States v. Jackson, 627 F.2d 1198, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 1980); United States v.
Gantt, 617 F.2d 831, 845-46 (D.C. Cir. 1980); United States v. Grassi, 616 F.2d 1295, 1300-01
(5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Petersen, 611 F.2d 1313, 1330-31 (10th Cir. 1979); United
States v. James, 590 F.2d 575, 581 (5th Cir. 1979).
"A See United States v. Grassi, 616 F.2d 1294, 1300-01 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v.
James, 590 F.2d 575, 581 (5th Cir. 1979).
' See United States v. Petersen, 611 F.2a 1313, 1330-31 (10th Cir. 1979).
" See text accompanying notes 131-139 infra.'
' See United States v. Jackson, 627 F.2d 1198, 1218 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (establishing pro-
cedure for conditionally admitted coconspirator statements).
I" See United States v. Gantt, 617 F.2d 831, 844-45, 845 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (reiterating
preponderance test in situation where coconspirator statements admitted unconditionally).
'" See note 146 infra (list of circuits using single step process). Under rule 611(a),
however, the judge may exercise considerable discretion in directing the prosecutor's
presentation of evidence. United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575, 590-91 (5th Cir. 1979)
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based on a preponderance of the evidence.130
In deciding whether a conspiracy exists, the judge' employs the
substantial independent evidence standard."' The judge normally makes
the substantial independent evidence ruling during the prosecutor's
case-in-chief.'32 In adopting the substantial independent evidence stan-
dard, both the Fifth and Tenth Circuits determined that the preponder-
ance test was inappropriate for a ruling usually made during the initial
stages of a proceeding."' The preponderance test, unlike substantial in-
dependent evidence, contemplates weighing the prosecution's case
against the defendant's case following presentation of all the evidence."'
The Tenth Circuit describes substantial independent evidence as
more than a scintilla.'35 "Substantial" means an amount, less than the
weight of the evidence, that a reasonable mind would deem sufficient to
support a conclusion."' .The Fifth Circuit defines substantial as at least
enough evidence to justify the court in risking the admission of hearsay
that may prove inadmissible at the ultimate determination of admissibil-
ity.'3 If the judge admits statements that later prove inadmissible, the
hearsay has prejudiced the defendant."' The risk the judge must justify,
therefore, is that he may later have to issue protective jury instructions
or declare a mistrial to safeguard the accused." 9
Following presentation of the accused's defense, the judge reevalu-
ates the admissibility question based on all the evidence presented."' In
the Fifth and Tenth Circuits the judge enters the coconspirator state-
ments into evidence if a preponderance of the independent evidence
favors admissibility."' The District of Columbia Circuit, in contrast, first
has the judge determined if the prosecutor adequately substantiated or
(Tjoflat & Ainsworth, JJ., specially concurring). Although circuit courts have procedures
normally followed for the admission of coconspirator statements, rule 611(a) grants the
judge and authority to deviate from that procedure to save court time, protect-a witness, or
aid the ascertainment of truth. 590 F.2d at 590; FED. R. EvID. 611(a).
,, See text accompanying 146-162 infra.
,31 United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575, 581 (5th Cir. 1979).
12 Id.
13 Id.; United States v. Petersen, 611 F.2d 1313, 1330 (10th Cir. 1979).
'" Compare United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575, 582 (5th Cir. 1979) with United
States v. Bell, 573 F.2d 1040, 1044 (8th Cir. 1978).
13 United States v. Petersen, 611 F.2d 1313, 1330 n.1 (10th Cir. 1979).
18 Id.
13, United States v. Grassi, 616 F.2d 1295, 1301 (5th Cir. 1980).
133 See United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575, 582 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Geaney, 417 F.2d 1116, 1120 (2d Cir. 1969).
, See United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575, 582 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Geaney, 417 F.2d 1116, 1120 (2d Cir. 1969). The course of remedial action the judge selects
must shield the defendant from the prejudice of the inadmissible coconspirator statements.
See 590 F.2d at 582; 417 F.2d at 1120.
1"0 United States v. Jackson, 627 F.2d 1198, 1219 (D.C.. Cir. i980); United States v.
James, 590 F.2d 575, 582 (5th Cir. 1979).
14 See United States v. Petersen, 611 F.2d 1313, 1330 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v.
James, 590 F.2d 575, 582 (5th Cir. 1979).
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"connected up" the coconspirator statements that the court previously
admitted.'42 The judge must then determine whether, considering both
the hearsay and independent evidence, he should submit the entire case
to the jury.' The judge submits the case to the jury if the prosecution
satisfies the standard enunciated in Curley v. United States.' The
Curley standard requires the judge to find that upon the evidence, giv-
ing the jury full authority to weigh the evidence, determine credibility,
and draw justifiable inferences, a reasonable mind might fairly conclude
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'
Eight circuits have the judge determine admissibility in a one-step
determination based on the preponderance of the evidence standard.' 6
Unlike the Fifth and Tenth Circuits, which also use the preponderance
standard for their ultimate determination of admissibility, these eight
circuits do not have a built-in preliminary step.'47 Rather, the judge
determines admissibility in one step.'48 To satisfy the preponderance of
the evidence standard, the prosecutor's evidence must be of greater
weight or more convincing than the defendant's evidence.' Under the
preponderance test the judge must carefully measure both the credibili-
ty and the weight of the evidence."' The prosecutor satisfies the
preponderance test if the judge concludes that the evidence as a whole
indicates that the conspiracy and the defendant's participation in the
conspiracy were more probable than not.'5 '
Courts that make a one-step admissibility determination using the
preponderance standard disagree over when the judge must make the
admissibility determination."2 Some courts allow the judge to make the
"' See United States v. Jackson, 627 F.2d 1198, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Coconspirator
Hearsay Exception, supra note 19, at 632.
"I See United States v. Jackson, 627 F.2d 1198, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Coconspirator
Hearsay Exception, supra note 19, at 632.
1. 160 F.2d 229 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 837 (1947); see United States v.
Jackson, 627 F.2d 1198, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
"' 160 F.2d at 232.
", See United States v. Kendricks, 623 F.2d 1165, 1167-68, 1168 n.5 (6th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Thompson, 621 F.2d 1147, 1153 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Provenzano,
620 F.2d 985, 1000 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v. Gantt, 617 F.2d 831, 844-45, 845 n.6 (D.C.
Cir. 1980); United States v. Baykowski, 615 F.2d 767, 771 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v.
McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1356-57 (7th Cir. 1979) (Pell, J., concurring); United States v.
Jones, 542 F.2d 186, 203 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v. Geaney, 417 F.2d 1116, 1120 (2d Cir.
1969).
", See text accompanying notes 124-130 supra.
,' See United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20, 23 (1st Cir. 1977) (judge determines
admissibility in one step); but cf. United States v. Bell, 573 F.2d 1040, 1043 (8th Cir. 1978)
(judge has authority to proscribe alternative procedures, such as admitting coconspirator
statements conditionally where circumstances require).
", MCCORMICK, supra note 4, § 339, 793-94 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972).
1W See United States v. Enright, 579 F.2d 980, 985; FEDERAL RULES MANUAL, supra
note 9, at 465.
"' See Procedure and Standard of Proof, supra note 10, at 594.
"' See text accompanying notes 143-147 supra.
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admissibility determination prior to the close of all the evidence. ' Other
circuits, however, indicate that the trial judge's determination of ad-
missibility on less than all the evidence could constitute reversible
error.154 Implicit in the preponderance standard is the idea of weighing
the prosecution's evidence against the defendant's. '55 Therefore, the fact-
finding logically should occur following presentation of the defendant's
case. ' A court's determination after hearing only the prosecutor's case
negates any difference in timing between the prima facie test and the
preponderance standard. 5 '
Proponents of the preponderance standard can draw support for the
adoption and continued use of the standard by analogy to situations in-
volving the admissiblity of a defendant's confession. Improp6rly admit-
ted defendant's confessions, like coconspirator statements 8 prejudice
the defendant by allowing the factfinder to use the inadmissible evidence
' See United States v. Baykowski, 615 F.2d 767, 771-72 (8th Cir. 1980) (slight deviation
from normal determination at end of all evidence allowed where substantial rights unaf-
fected). In Baykowski the Eighth Circuit deviated from the First Circuit's one-step ap-
proach. Id.; see United States v. Fontanez, 628 F.2d 687, 689-90 (1st Cir. 1980); United States
v. Ciampaglia, 628 F.2d 632, 638 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 956 (1980). Prior to
Baykowski the Eighth Circuit required the judge to reserve the ruling until after the defen-
dant's case. See United States v. Bell, 573 F.2d 1040, 1044 (judge should make determination
following presentation of all evidence). But cf. United States v. Littlefield, 594 F.2d 682, 686
(8th Cir. 1979) (Bell procedure is flexible and not infallible, and court should hesitate to fault
trial court for failure to comply literally with Bell procedures). The trial court in Baykowski
made the admissibility ruling at the close of the government's case-in-chief. 615 F.2d at 771.
The Baykowski court determined that this minor deviation from the usual procedure did
not affect the defendant's substantive rights. Id. at 771-72. Consequently, the Eighth Circuit
did not disturb the lower court's ruling.
" See United States v. Ciampaglia, 628 F.2d 632, 638 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v.
Stanchich, 550 F.2d 1294, 1298 (2d Cir. 1977). The First and Second Circuits have stated that
the judge has to offer the defendant an opportunity to disprove the conspiracy. See 628 F.2d
at 638, 550 F.2d at 1298.
' See United States v. Ciampaglia, 628 F.2d 632, 638 (1st Cir. 1980).
' See id.; United States v. Bell, 573 F.2d 1040, 1044 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Stanchich, 550 F.2d 1294, 1298 (2d Cir. 1977). But cf. United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575,
591 n.8 (5th Cir. 1979) (Tjoflat, J., specially concurring) (parties most likely would want
review of evidence following government's case-in-chief so they know precisely what
evidence is in record and will go to jury. Unless court determines just what evidence is in
record, court may have difficulty determining motions for judgment of acquittal or for
mistrial).
'5" See United States v. Ciampaglia, 628 F.2d 632, 638 (1st Cir. 1980) (unless defendant
presents evidence before court's ruling, prima facie and preponderance standards both ap-
plied following government's case-in-chief).
'' See United States v. James, 576 F.2d 1121, 1129 (5th Cir. 1978). With coconspirator
statements, the danger the James court tried to avoid was that the jury would use the
coconspirator statements before or without first determining the question of admissibility.
Id. In terms of defendants' confessions, courts feared that the jury's belief that although the
confession was coerced, the confession also was true, would influence the voluntariness
determination. Id. Both situations prejudice the accused by the factfinder's use of improp-
erly admitted evidence. Id. See also United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 n.14 (1974)
(courts also apply preponderance standard in suppression hearings).
1982]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA WREVIEW
in resolving the question of guilt.159 In Lego v. Twomey,6 ' the Supreme
Court refused to abandon the preponderance standard in determining
the voluntariness of a defendant's confession. 6' Since the preponderance
standard affords adequate protection in confession cases, the standard
must offer at least commensurate protection in coconspirator declara-
tion cases. Lego implies that the Supreme Court would endorse the
preponderance standard for determining the admissibility of coconspira-
tor declarations. Several circuits have based in part their adoption of the
preponderance standard upon this interpretation of Lego. 6'
Only one circuit has retained the prima facie standard" used at com-
mon law.' The prima facie standard is equivalent to the standard
employed by judges to determine whether enough evidence exists to
overcome a motion for a directed verdict.-' At the end of the govern-
ment's case-in-chief, 6  the judge evaluates the evidence in a light most
favorable to the government. 7 The judge then admits the declaration if
the independent proof creates a reasonable inference sufficient to sup-
port a finding that a conspiracy existed and that the defendant was part
of the conspiracy.'68 The prosecution's proof only needs to be strong
enough to support a jury finding, not compel one.'69 Moreover, the
evidence presented does not have to compel to finding beyond a reason-
able doubt. 7 '
I" See United States v. James, 576 F.2d 1121, 1129 (5th Cir. 1978); Exception to the
Hearsay Rule, supra note 45, at 1127-28.
"0 404 U.S. 477 (1972).
161 Id. at 488. The majority in Lego based its refusal to abandon the preponderance
standard for determining the admissibility of confessions on two points. First, the Court
stated that no evidence existed to suggest that admissibility rulings based on the
preponderance standard infringed on the accused's constitutional rights. Id. The Court also
weighed the benefit in deterring unlawful conduct of police and prosecutors by placing a
greater burden of proof upon the prosecution against the public interest in presenting more
evidence to the jury by using a lower burden of proof. Id. at 489. The majority concluded
that a greater standard would not serve as a worthwhile deterrant compared to the reduc-
tion in admissible evidence that would ensue from a greater standard. Id.
162 See United States v. Enright, 579 F.2d 980, 985 (6th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Stanchich, 550 F.2d 1294, 1299 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20, 23
(1st Cir. 1977).
" See United States v. Zemek, 634 F.2d 1159, 1170 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101
S.C. 1359 (1981); United States v. Batimana, 623 F.2d 1366, 1368 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1038 (1980); United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 768-69 (9th Cir. 1978).
16 See United States v. Zemek, 634 F.2d 1159, 1170 (9th Cir. 1980) (coconspirator
statements admissible if substantial independent evidence establishes prima facie case).
" See United States v. Calaway, 524 F.2d 609, 612 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 967 (1976); MCCORMICK, supra note 4, § 338 at 789-90; see FED. R. Civ. P. 50.
1 See Procedure and Standard of Proof, supra note 10, at 593.
187 See United States v. Rosales, 584 F.2d 870, 872 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Nelson, 419 F.2d 1237, 1242 (9th Cir. 1969).
16 See Procedure and Standard of Proof, supra note 10, at 592.
169 United States v. Trotter, 529 F.2d 806, 812 n.8 (3d Cir. 1976) (prima facie standard
only requires enough evidence to take question to jury).
"I United States v. Calaway, 524 F.2d 609, 612 (9th Cir. 1975).
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None of the circuit courts expressly require the prosecution to
satisfy the reasonable doubt standard. Judges in some jurisdictions,
however, have resubmitted the question of admissibility to the jury.1
When the judge instructs the jury to make the ultimate admissibility
determination, the jury employs the reasonable doubt standard.
1 7
1
Several circuits have condoned the practice of sending the issue to the
jury by ruling that the trial judge's submission of the admissibility ques-
tion to the jury did not constitute reversible error.' Certain courts
reasoned that this "added layer of factfinding" could rarely prejudice
the defendant.1 7' However, this process of resubmitting the admissibility
question to the jury is "internally inconsistent" and "potentially confus-
ing."'7 For instance, the judge could find that the coconspirator
statements were admissible and the jury could then reach a contrary
result. Several circuits have therefore spoken out against allowing the
jury to second guess the judge's determinationY.
1 7
Several commentators have endorsed the reasonable doubt stan-
dard. 7 At least one commentator argues that in the case of a criminal
defendant, exposure to unreliable evidence conceivably violates the ac-
cused's sixth amendment right to confront the declarant.178 A plurality of
the Supreme Court concluded in Dutton v. Evans' that coconspirator
statements must bear sufficient indicia of reliability in order not to deny
a criminal defendant his constitutional right of confrontation. 0 Cocon-
171 See United States v. Kahan, 572 F.2d 923, 936 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
833 (1978); United States v. Mitchell, 556 F.2d 371, 377 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 924
(1977); United States v. King, 552 F.2d 833, 849 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 966
(1978).
'" See Dennis v. United States, 346 F.2d 10, 16 (10th Cir. 1965), rev'd on other grounds,
384 U.S. 855 (1966).
171 See United States v. Nickerson, 606 F.2d 156, 158 (6th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Petrozziello, 584 F.2d 20, 23 (1st Cir. 1977); United States v. Knight, 416 F.2d 1181, 1186 (2d
Cir. 1969).
" United States v. Nickerson, 606 F.2d 156, 158 (6th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Petrozziello, 584 F.2d 20, 23 (1st Cir. 1977).
171 United States v. Enright, 579 F.2d 980, 987 (6th Cir. 1978).
178 See id., (trial court should have sole responsibility for ruling on admissibility of
evidence); United States v. Bell, 573 F.2d 1040, 1044 (8th Cir. 1978) (court should not charge
jury on admissibility of coconspirator statement); United States v. Bey, 437 F.2d 183, 192 (3d
Cir. 1971) (judge should not give jury opportunity to second guess his admissibility deter-
mination). Accord United States v. Trowery, 542 F.2d 623, 627-28 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1104 (1977). But cf. United States v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1227, 1232 n.7 (8th Cir. 1978)
(court agrees with Petrozziello that additional layer of fact-finding is not prejudicial).
1" See J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 104-44 (1977); Bergman, The
Coconspirator's Exception, supra note 11, at 106; but see Saltzburg, Standards of Proof and
Preliminary Questions of Fact, 27 STAN. L. REV. 271, 303-04 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Standard of Proof] (reasonable doubt standard too demanding on prosecutor).
8 See 28 DRAKE L. REV. 198, 208-09 (1978-79). But see United States v. Marks, 585 F.2d
164, 170 n.5 (6th Cir. 1978) (if the evidence satisfies the coconspirator exception, the confron-
tation right under the sixth amendment is not violated).
400 U.S. 74 (1970).
Id. at 90-92.
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spirator statements accepted into evidence on less than a reasonable
doubt standard arguably have questionably reliability and therefore
threaten to violate the confrontation clause."'
The arguments favoring the preponderance standard outweigh the
merits of the reasonable doubt standard. Advocates of the reasonable
doubt standard have failed to present substantial proof of buttress their
claim that the preponderance standard permits the use of unreliable
evidence.'82 Even if potential unreliability and prejudice to the defendant
indicate the need to apply the reasonable doubt standard, the prosecu-
tion's intense need for evidence makes the likelihood of courts adopting
the standard remote."' Use of the reasonable doubt standard unfairly
would burden unfairly the prosecutor in presenting the state's case.184
Courts reason that since the judge is ruling on the question of ad-
missibility and not the ultimate question of guilt, the preponderance
standard if more appropriate.'85
As in all situations where adversary parties collide, lawmakers must
strive for a fair resolution of the competing interests involved. The
defendant confronted with coconspirator declarations has a right to ex-
amine his witnesses and have a prejudice-free trial.'88 The state has an
obligation to protect society and punish those who violate the laws.
Judges must decide whether to allow the prosecutor to enter a cocon-
spirator's statement at the risk of subjecting the accused to hearsay
evidence. The substantial independent evidence and prima facie stan-
dards unduly expose the defendant to unreliable evidence.' The
181 See 28 DRAKE L. REV. 198, 210 (1978-79).
182 See id. at 205.
18 See Exception to the Hearsay Rule, supra note 45, at 1134. A further problem with
using the reasonable doubt standard arises in cases involving the criminal charge of con-
spiracy. If the factfinder in a conspiracy case can admit the coconspirator statements only
when convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that a conspiracy existed, then the factfinder
never can consider the evidence in reaching its determination. Carbo v. United States, 314
F.2d 718, 736 (2d Cir. 1963). The factfinder first would have to find the defendant guilty, and
the coconspirator statements then would serve only confirm what the jury already had
decided. Id. In other words, the coconspirator statements could not serve any purpose if the
factfinder already was convinced that a conspiracy existed. Id.
18 See Standard of Proof, supra note 177, at 303. The crime of conspiracy, by its very
nature, is difficult for prosecutors to substantiate. See Hearsay and Conspiracy, supra note
102, at 1160. Direct proof of the coconspirators' intent is unavailable and written evidence of
the agreement is rare. Id. Consequently, prosecutors have a great need for the court to
admit as much evidence as possible. Id. at 1163-66. Forcing prosecutors to prove admissibili-
ty beyond a reasonable doubt would make the prosecutor's search for evidence more dif-
ficult. Standards of Proof, supra note 177, at 303. But see W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, CRIMINAL
LAW § 61 at 455 (1972) (conspiracy is one of the most easily proven of all crimes).
18 See United States v. Santiago, 582 F.2d 1128, 1134 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Bell, 573 F.2d 1040, 1044 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20, 23 (1st
Cir. 1977).
188 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.




reasonable doubt standard unfairly aids the accused in concealing his
guilt beyond his constitutional safeguards.'88 The preponderance of the
evidence standard most fairly balances the competing interests of the
prosecutor and the accused.' 9
CARY RICHARD BOND
Im See FEDERAL RULES MANUAL, supra note 9, at 333; Exception to the Hearsay Rule,
supra note 45, at 1134 (admissibility standard should not be so high as to preclude pro-
secutors from proving their case).
,' See text accompanying notes 146-162 supra.
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